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Civilian criminal sanctions for indebtedness were for the most
part repealed during the colonial era. Imprisonment for debt as a
method of enforcing commercial obligations is now banned in every
state.' State law prohibitions vary in certain respects, but all forbid
criminal sanctions against the honest but insolvent debtor.2 Most
statutes permit imprisonment only where fraud is involved in contract
delinquency.3 In one very large jurisdiction, however, the sanctions for
indebtedness remain. Under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), the general article for enlisted men,4 it is
a crime to fail, dishonorably, to pay a debt. This Note will examine
1. Forty-one states ban imprisonment for indebtedness by provisions in their constitu-
tions, and nine have statutory prohibitions. The enactments present a wide spectrum
from an absolute ban to a less stringent requirement that the debtor should be released
by means of a poor debtorls oath so long as he has turned over his property to his credi-
tors and does not plan to abscond from the jurisdiction. The constitutional provisions are:
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 17; Amz. CoNsr. art. II, § 18; Am. Co.sr.
art. II, § 16; CAL-. CONsr. art. I, § 15; COLO. CONSr. art. II, § 12; FL&. Coxsr., Dec). of Rights
§ 16; GA. CoNsr. art. I, § 2-121; HAWAII CONSr. art. I, § 17; IDAno Coxsr. art. I, § 15;
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 12; IND. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22; IowA Co:xsr. art. 1, § 19; KAN. Co.%sr.,
Bill of Rights § 16; Ky. CONST., Bill of Rights § 18; MD. CoNsr. art. III, § 38; Micit. Co- s.
art. I, § 21; MINN. CONsr. art. 1, § 12; MIss. CONsT. art. III, § SO; Mo. Coxsr. art. I. § 11;
MONT. Coasr. art. III, § 12; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 20; NEV. CoNsr. art. 1, § 14; N.J. Co.Nsr.
art. I, 1 13; N.M. CONs?. art. II, § 21; N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 28; N.D. CoNsr. art. I, § 15;
Omo CONST. art. I, § 15; OKA. CoNsr. art. If, § 13; ORE. CONsr. art. I, § 19; PA. Coxsr.
art. I, § 16; R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 11, S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 24; S.D. Coxsr. art. 1, § 15;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 18; Tsx. CONsT. art. I, § 18; UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 16; Vr. CoNsr.
ch. I, § 22; WASH. CoNST. art. I, § 17; VIS. CONST. art. I, § 16; Wyo. Coxsr. art. 1, § 5.
Statutory provisions include: CONN. GN. STAT. § 18-56 (1958); 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 5052
(1953); LA. Ray. STAT. § 9:2664 (1964); 14 Mr. REv. STAT. § S605 (1964); ANNOTATEo LAWS
OF MAss. c 224 § 6 (1955); N.H. Rv. STAT. 533:13 (1955); N.Y. DrroR AND CMnarroa LAw
§ 132 (McKinney 1940); CODE OF VA. § 8-567 (1950); and IV. VA. CODE § 3-5-5 (1966).
The Supreme Court has upheld the state bans on imprisonment for debt, holding that
they do not violate U. S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 10, which prohibits any law impairing the
obligation of contracts. Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1880); Mason v. Hale, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 370 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122" (1819).
2. See, e.g., RI. CONsr. art. 1, § 11:
The person of the debtor, when there is not a strong presumption of fraud, ought
not to be continued in prison, after he shall have delivered up his property for the
benefit of his creditors, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law;
and Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 11:
[N]o person shall be imprisoned for debt, except for nonpayment of fines and penalties
imposed by law.
S. See, e.g., People v. LaMothe, 331 Ill. 351, 163 N.E. 6 (1928). One state has banned
imprisonment even when fraud is present. Carr v. State, 106 Ala. -5, 17 So. 350 (1894).
4. 10 U.S.C. § 924 (1970). The Uniform Code of Military Justice is embodied in 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). (To convert the U.S.C. reference to an article of the UCMJ,
subtract 800; thus 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) is Article 134). This Note is concerned almost
entirely with the indebtedness specification under Article 134, rather than the similar
provision in Article 13, the general article for officers (see note 12 infra). The effect of
discrediting conduct by officers, who must be able to command the respect of their sub-
ordinates, may present a different set of considerations from those pertaining to Artilde
134 prosecutions.
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the attempted military, economic and legal justifications for this crimi-
nal sanction. It will argue that the military punishment for delinquent
indebtedness traverses the intended boundaries of the UCMJ, serves
no vital military purpose, requires the services to play an inappropriate
and indefensible role in the collection process, and runs afoul of the
jurisdictional restrictions placed on military tribunals by the Supreme
Court in O'Callahan v. Parker.5
I. Prosecutions under Article 134
Article 134 prohibits any act that might bring discredit to the mili-
tary or undermine military order and discipline:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
in this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance by a
general, special or summary court-martial, according to the nature
and the degree of the offense and shall be punished at the dis-
cretion of the court.0
Article 134 does not itself mention anything about failure to pay a
debt. The accusation in any military trial is composed of both
a "charge," which is the relevant article of the UCMJ,1 and a "specifi-
cation." The specification, a list of the factual allegations which sup.
port the change, is derived from the Manual for Courts-Martial. Prose-
cution for failure to pay indebtedness under Article 134 is authorized
by Specification 138 of the Manual.8 If convicted, a serviceman can be
5. 395 US. 258 (1969).
6. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970).
For critical analysis of the gcneral articles, see Hagan, The General Artlicle-Elmen tal
Confusion, 10 MILITARY L. REV. 63 (1960); Nelson, Conduct Expected of An Officer and
A Gentleman: Ambiguity, 12 US.A.F. JAG L. REv. 124 (1970); Nichols, The Devil's Article,
22 MILITARY L. REV. 111 (1963); Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstiltu
tionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968); Note, 34 NED. L. REv. 518 (1955); Note, The
Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: Unrestricted Anachronism, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821 (1971).
7. MANUAL FOR CouRTs-INARTIAL UNITED STATES § 24 (rev. ed. 1969).
8. Specification 138 reads:
In that - , being indebted to - in the sum of $-- for -, which amount
became due and payable (on) (about) (on or about) - , did, (at) (on board) -'
from - 19- to - 19-, wrongfully and dishonorably to pay said debt,
Id. at App. 6c.
A wide spectrum of crimes are punishable under Article 134. See, e.g., United States v,
Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969) (assault with intent to kill); United States v.
Marshall, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 426, 40 C.M.R. 138 (1969) (bribery and graft); United States v.
Rener, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 65, 37 C.M.R. 329 (1967) (unlawful cohabitation); United States
v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (ACMR 1968) (making disloyal statements to promote disaffection
among servicemen).
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punished by up to six months imprisonment, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances for six months, reduction in rank to the lowest grade, and
a bad conduct discharge.9 In evaluating the military crime of indebted-
ness, one must examine the types of acts for which indebtedness prose-
cution is undertaken, the military discipline rationale which has been
employed to justify prosecution, and the merits of using a military
sanction as a civilian creditor collection device.
A. Three Categories of Prosecutions
Article 134 prosecutions for dishonorable failure to pay a just debt
fall into three categories.' 0 The first involves transactions where the fail-
ure to pay has a potentially detrimental effect upon military discipline.
A typical example is a loan between two servicemen. In United States v.
True," for instance, an Army captain borrowed $245 from a lieutenant
under his command and ignored a later request for repayment. The
officer was prosecuted and convicted under Article 133, the general
article for officers.' 2 In affirming, an Army Board of Review stressed
the traditional military disapproval of monetary transactions between
servicemen of different rank. The Board saw a threat to military
discipline and morale because an officer had used his rank to secure
a private gain from his subordinate, and because failure to repay would
destroy the trust servicemen must have in each other to act effectively
as a unit. 3
The second category involves off-base consumer transactions in which
the serviceman commits the kind of fraud punishable under state law.
While state laws vary, the crime of fraud has at least two overlapping,
indispensable characteristics. The act must include deceit, evasion, or
misrepresentation, directed toward and relied upon by one to whom
9. L4UAL FoR Cours-MARrAL UNTED STAT.s I 127c (rev. ed. 1969).
10. The categories delineated in this Note have been developed solely as an aid to
analysis. Neither the Court of Military Appeals nor military Boards of Review have ever
proposed or explicitly outlined the categories employed here.
11. 10 C.M.R. 328 (ACM1, 1953). The Courts of Military Review, which were called
Boards of Review prior to a 1968 amendment to the UCMJ, are intermediate appellate
courts. Appeals from these courts can be taken to the Court of Military Appeals. a three-
member court with civilian judges. For a description of the functions of these tribunals,
see 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970), and 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970):
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, who is convicted of conduct un-
becoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
The provision for an officer's dishonorable failure to pay a debt is authorized by Specifica-
tion 124, MANuAL FoR CouRrs-MARtnAL UNrn STATEs (rev. ed. 1969).
13. 10 C.M.R. at 332. See also United States v. Conway, 11 C.M.RL 625 (NCMR 1953)
gofficer using his status to borrow from an enlisted man).
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the defendant owes a duty,14 and the perpetrator must have scienter.1 q
A series of court-martial prosecutions under the failure to pay indebted-
ness provision has involved instances of fraud. In United States v.
Blount,0 the military debtor made purchases with bad checks. Con-
fronted with his worthless checks, the delinquent soldier pledged to
his creditor that he would make immediate payment, but continued to
evade the obligation. An Army Board of Review affirmed an Article
134 conviction, finding that the defendant had no intention to pay the
debt when he made his pledge. Since the promise induced the creditor
to forego immediate legal action, fraud was present. In United States v.
DeLancey,17 an airman was accused of nine counts of dishonorable
failure to pay in connection with taxi cab fares. The serviceman left at
the eid of each ride without paying, never using the same cab twice.
The court decided that the scheme was a fraudulent attempt to avoid
the fare, since business custom required immediate payment.1 8 Here,
as in Blount, the court looked to the debtor's dealings with his creditor
to establish culpability.
In the third category of prosecutions are cases in which neither fraud
nor a direct concern for military discipline exists. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has upheld convictions in these cases on the principle that
the serviceman evinced dishonor in failing to meet his obligations. The
factual situations in which dishonor has been found are extremely
diverse and correspond to nothing in the civilian law of misrepresenta-
tion. Although dishonor within the meaning of Article 134 cannot
be found either in simple non-payment or in negligently contracting
too many financial obligations, 0 the prosecution need not prove fraud.
In fact, the evidence used to establish dishonor often ignores the deal-
ings between the debtor and creditor, which are crucial to civilian
fraud.
An example may be found in the use of gratuitous statements made
to third parties to show dishonor. In United States v. Bonar,0 the de-
14. See generally 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 1 (1943); Eliason v. Willburn, 335 111. 352, 167
N.E. 101 (1929), aff'd, 281 U.S. 457 (1930).
15. See C. W. Denning & Co. v. Suncrest Lumber Co., 51 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1931).
16. 5 C.M.R. 297 (ACMR 1952).
17. 34 C.M.R. 845 (AFCMR 1964).
18. Id. at 848.
19. United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955). See also p, 1683
infra. For sources discussing the constitutional issues raised by the vagueness of the general
articles, see note 6 supra.
20. 40 C.M.R. 482 (ACMR 1969). The Army has instructed its commanders to play an
active role in indebtedness counseling. See p. 1686 and note 34 infra.
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fendant had been counseled on three occcasions by his commanding
officer to pay a delinquent bill. The soldier never made any representa-
tions to, nor had any contacts with, his creditor. An Army Board of
Review relied heavily on the defendant's discussions with his command-
ing officer in finding him criminally liable.
On one occasion appellant stated that he would "take care of it."
His failure to do so indicates the existence of gross indifference, if
not bad faith, and warrants the conclusion that his conduct was,
under the circumstances, dishonorable.2'
A second case illustrates graphically that dishonor is not necessarily
equated with fraud. In United States v. Swanson,22 a serviceman was dis-
charged in bankruptcy. The referee made no finding of fraud or mis-
representation. 23 Nevertheless, in a subsequent court martial, the
serviceman was convicted for dishonorable failure to pay the discharged
debt. An Air Force Board of Review affirmed, holding that the referee's
examination into the creditor-debtor relationship was not determinative
in the criminal proceedings.
In only the second of the three categories, then, does the Article 134
standard coincide with that required for civilian prosecutions. In the
first and third categories, the serviceman is being punished for an act
for which no civilian criminal sanction exists. Of course, the mere fact
that the substantive content of Article 134 debt prosecutions differs
from the civilian norm is not, in itself, ground for disapproval.
The specific goals of the military justice system make necessary
many crimes, such as being absent without leave,2 4 which have no civil-
ian counterparts. But even if some variance between military and
criminal law is permissible, the question remains: is prosecution for
dishonorable failure to pay a debt justifiable? In answering that ques-
tion, attention must be focused on the purposes of the separate system
of military justice.
21. Id. at 484. This fact situation points to a way in which simple indebtedness is
converted into the punishable category of dishonorable failure to pay a debL But cf. p.
1682 supra. A unit commander often confronts the debtor with the creditors letter of
complaint and explains the possible use of Article 134 to punish dishonorable indebted-
ness. Then the commander asks the debtor what steps he intends to take to pay the
creditor. Any attempt by the debtor to mollify his military superior witl a promise to
take care of the debt can become the factual basis of the dishonor if the meviceman then
fails to pay.
22. 25 C.M.R. 832 (AFOCR 1957).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), which provides that fraudulent debts cannot be discharged.
24. Article 86 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1970).
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B. The Military Discipline Rationale
The UCMJ was enacted, as were previous Articles of War, pursuant
to Congress' power "to make Rules for the Government and Regula-
tion of the land and naval Forces.' '25 The American mandate for a
distinct order of military justice is not unique; the dichotomy between
civilian and military systems of justice may be traced back to early
Greek and Roman legal systems. 20 Although American systems of mili-
tary law have varied through the years, there has been a single under-
lying purpose for each-to maintain discipline in the armed forces. As
a nineteenth century commentator argued:
If a national army be established, it is indispensably requisite that
order and discipline should be established. To effect this, it is
necessary that the duties of the military be defined and their perfor-
mance enforced, under appropriate penalties, by tribunals appoin-
ted for that purpose. For this reason, rules and articles of war are
ever found to accompany an army.27
The Congressional history of the UCMJ indicates that its drafters con-
ceived the military code as a vehicle for enforcing and furthering
discipline in the armed forces. This philosophy manifested itself in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of' the code.
28
But even given the essential relation of military law to discipline, it
must still be asked whether Article 134 debt prosecutions are necessary
to the proper maintenance of discipline in the armed services.
As to offenses in the first category, where there is a potentially detri.
mental effect on discipline, it is clear that the military has a possible
interest in prosecution. The use of rank to obtain loans from subordin-
ates or the refusal of one serviceman to repay another could affect the
morale of the personnel involved and hamper their ability to act
effectively as a unit. Yet even here the abuses could be reached through
means other than imprisonment for debt. The military could provide,
either through general regulations or unit orders, that intra-military
loans are prohibited.2 9 Such a proscription might tend to eliminate one
type of abuse-the use of rank to obtain a loan-more effectively than
25. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
26. See generally W. WIiTHROP, MILITARY LAw 4-10 (1886).
27. J. O'BRIEN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS 25 (1846).
28. See Hearings on S. 857 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
29. Article 92 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970). The article authorizes dlisciplinary actlon
for the violation of any lawful general order or regulation.
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the current sanction, since the superior who repays is now outside
the ambit of Article 134.
It is still more difficult to see a persuasive argument based on military
discipline for Article 134 debt prosecutions in the last two categories.3
By definition, such transactions occur off-base, in non-combat situations,
and involve only one serviceman, the debtor. In the second category,
where criminal fraud is involved, it could be argued that the debtor's
status as a "criminal" affects his ability to function as a serviceman. 31
Even if this, or some other military discipline rationale is accepted,
however, a criminal sanction rooted in the dishonorable failure to pay
provision is unnecessary. Prosecutions could take place either in civilian
courts or under the general provisions of Article 134, on the theory that
acts criminal under state law are "discrediting."32 As to offenses in the
last category, where fraud is absent, no military justification in terms of
discipline exists. The serviceman is not a criminal, he is merely a de-
faulting debtor. Indeed, where promises to unrelated third parties (e.g.,
unit commanders) are relied upon to find "dishonor," Article 134 is
itself the cause of many offenses. Were it not for the Article 134 threat
of prosecution, the initial conversation with the commanding officer
might not occur and there might never be any gratuitous pledge of
payment.
Thus, prosecution for the crime of dishonorable failure to pay a
debt satisfies no legitimate demand of military discipline, and so exceeds
the intended scope of the UCMJ. To the extent that intra-military trans-
actions or real criminal conduct is involved, prosecution is possible
through other UCMJ provisions or through general orders of the mili-
tary services. Article 134 may reach some situations where prosecution
from some quarter is warranted. But it often (particularly in its applica-
tion to the third category of prosecutions) extends to cases that have no
connection with the essential goal of military law-to maintain dis-
cipline.
C. Prosecution as a Collection Device
Can debt prosecutions, then, be defended as a device salutary for
30. See note 41 infra.
31. For example, military regulations require that convicted servicemen lose their
security clearances, be removed from sensitive positions, and be ineligible for any favor-
able personnel action, such as promotion or transfer, for specific periods of time. An v
REGULATION 600-31 (June 29, 1970).
32. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITD STATES 213(e) (rev. ed. 1969). where
it is suggested that acts constituting violations of state laws may constitute "discrediting"
conduct under Article 134. see also Hagan, supra note 6, at 71.
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the creditors of military personnel? It is certainly true that economic
rationales form a powerful, if unstated, basis for indebtedness prosecu-
tions under Article 134. As one commentator noted:
Unfortunately, though, as many military lawyers will testify, [A]r-
ticle 134 is sometimes used as a lever by overreaching finance
companies or sellers to secure payment of unjust claims. Time and
again a serviceman will be terrified into paying a claim because of a
letter from his alleged creditor-often with a copy to the accused's
commander-wherein he is informed that he is subject to prosecu-
tion under [A]rticle 134.
33
The U.S. Army, while expressing its inablity to compel payment of
private debts, has in the past told its commanders to "give careful con-
sideration to the public relations aspect involved in private indebted-
ness and financial obligations."34 The military directs its officers to
discuss private indebtedness with the serviceman concerned, reminding
commanding officers of their possible recourse to criminal sanctions of
Article 134.35 Indeed, the use of Article 134 as a creditor device has been
indirectly recognized by military courts.30 Thus, in diverse ways, the
military services become collection arms for private business.
Several commercial reasons have been advanced to justify this rela-
tionship. Major James E. Simon37 has argued that military personnel
often are transient and depend upon their military status for com-
mercial credit, and that the creditor's recourse to civil remedies is often
frustrated because of servicemen's transfers. 8 Another argument is that,
at common law, the ban on garnishment of the sovereign effectively
prohibits the garnishment of servicemen's pay.30 Moreover, the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194040 severely restricts the creditor's
33. Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A Study in Vagueness,
37 N. CAR. L. REv. 142, 147 (1959).
34. 24 Fed. Reg. 14 (1959), embodied in 32 C.F.R. § 513.1(a) until 1971, when the
quoted langauge was deleted. The new regulations are directed primarily to creditors
rather than unit commanders, and explain the procedures for acquiring military assistance
in contacting debtors.
35. 24 Fed. Reg. 14 (1959), embodied in 32 C.F.R. § 513.1(b) until 1971, when the
changes referred to in note 34 supra were enacted.
36. In United States v. Cummins, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 26 C.M.R. 449 (1958), the Court
of Military Appeals held that Article 134 proceedings cannot commence over the objection
of the creditor. In short, the device is not self-starting; it proceeds only when someone
seeks to collect a debt.
37. Simon, A Survey of Worthless Check Offenses, 14 MILITARY L. REV. 29 (1961).
38. The Army is, however, willing to notify creditors of a soldier's current location,
See 32 C.F.R. § 513.1(c)(4) (1971).
39. See generally 78 CoNe. REC. 2231 (1944) (remarks of Representative Mlchencr); It,
SHINN, A TREATIsE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ATrACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT § 00 (1900),
40. 50 U.S.C. § 510 (1964). For a thorough discussion of the practical effect of the act, see
W. ANDEIsON, LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS AND SAILORS UNDER CivIl REur Aar (1941).
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opportunity to collect. This Act protects servicemen from the harass-
ment of civil suits that they cannot defend properly due to military
commitments. A serviceman can stay proceedings in a civil case as to
both judgment and attachment. This stay remains in effect until he can
return to prepare a defense, which in some cases may be possible only
at the conclusion of his military duty.
These various facts undoubtedly complicate collection for the ci-
vilian creditor.41 But even if it is conceded that special difficulties are
faced by the serviceman's creditors, a fundamental issue remains-
namely, whether the armed services should in effect operate as a collec-
don agency.42 Punctual credit payments by servicemen certainly are
not relevant to their ability to perform military duties. There are federal
employees who share, at least, the protection from garnishment 3 and
the characteristic of being transient, but do not face criminal sanctions.
No one would suggest that all government employees should be sub-
jected to criminal penalities for indebtedness, and servicemen should
not be treated differently.
Moreover, even if some collection device were justifiable, use of the
Article 134 indebtedness sanction would still be open to substantial
criticism. In the first place, while threats of Article 134 prosecutions
may have some initial force to compel payment, most of the collection
value of Article 134 is lost once the creditor presses charges to begin
the criminal process. Since Article 134 is a criminal charge, the trial
is not aimed at reimbursing the creditor. It is the "dishonor," not
the debt, that is relevant. Consequently, the prosecution cannot be
terminated by the serviceman's satisfaction of the obligation.44 In-
41. Soldiers have historically enjoyed some immunityfrom civilian collection techniques.
RuLEs AND ARTIcLES OF WAR, § 10 (1775); Act of May 28, 1798, 1 ch. 47, § 14, 1 Sat. 560,
both reported in J. CALLAN, THE MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNrrEn STATEs 53, 88 (1858).
42. The military services engage much more actively in debt collection than a Civilian
employer. For example, before a civilian employer can garnish the wages of an employee.
the debtor must be afforded prior notice and a hearing. Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The military cooperation in locating servicemen for creditors,
in counseling military debtors and in utilizing UCMIJ sanctions against the debtor often
begin on a creditor's application without any hearing or other civil court proceeding.
Moreover, the military plays a prominent role in punishing the serviceman-debtor for his
commercial actions through the criminal sanctions of the general articles. A civilian
employer is prohibited by federal statute from firing an employee whose wages are gar-
nished once. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1971). Yet the military not only can prejudicially discharge
the debtor, it can impose fines and penal confinement on the offender. The jurisdictional
problems inherent in court-martial intervention into off-post commercial transactions vill
be considered more fully at pp. 1688-94 infra.
43. Congress has considered lifting the ban on garnishment of government employees.
During World War H administrative problems defeated a bill designed to permit garnish
ment of federal employees, excluding servicemen. Hearings on H.R. 2985 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). H.R. 1517, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), would permit garnishment of all federal employees, including tervicemen.
44. United States v. Journell, 18 C.M.R. 752 (AFICMR 1955).
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deed, even if the debt no longer exists, because, for example, it has been
discharged in bankruptcy, the trial for failure to pay continues."
Secondly, the criminal nature of Article 134 reduces not only the incen.
tive but also the ability of the debtor to pay. Forfeitures resulting from
a court martial are paid to the government. Imprisonment, reduction
in rank, or prejudicial discharge seriously impair the capacity of a
serviceman to satisfy his delinquent debt. The court martial provides
spite value, but may insure that the creditor will never be paid.
If Article 134 prosecution is really designed to strip immunity from
the serviceman in commercial transactions, there are more efficacious
alternatives. Congress could repeal the safeguards implemented in the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, or allow garnishment of ser-
vicemen's pay.48 These steps would aid creditors in collection, and make
military personnel, as a group, better credit risks. Alternatively, the
government could be made a co-signer of installment obligations of the
military buyer. The services could be given authority to deduct money
from the serviceman's pay in the event that the government was com-
pelled to honor the obligation. Any of these systems or a combination
of them would facilitate military credit and give more actual benefit to
the creditor than Article 134. They would also terminate the awkward
and improper role of the military services in the collection process. The
criminal sanction is not only inappropriate here, it is unjustifiable.
II. O'Callahan v. Parker and the Nature of Service Connection
Apart from the considerations above, the validity of military
sanctions for indebtedness must be seriously questioned in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in O'Callahan v. Parker.47 In that case,
an Army sergeant on authorized pass in Hawaii broke into a hotel room
occupied by a young girl, assaulted her, and attempted to rape her.
O'Callahan challenged his court-martial conviction in a habeas corpus
action, successfully contending that the military lacked jurisdiction
to try him for a crime committed off duty and off post.
45. United States v. Swanson, 25 C.M.R. 832 (AFCMR 1957).
46. See note 42 supra.
47. 395 US. 258 (1969).
There is a flood of comment about O'Callahan; see, e.g., Blumenfeld, Court.Martial
Jurisdiction Over Civilian-Type Crimes, 10 AM. Cum. L. REv. 51 (1971); Everett, O'Callahan
v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 853; Rice, O'Callahan
v. Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction, "Service Connection," Confusion and the Serviceman,
51 MILrrARY L. REV. 41 (1971); Note, O'Callahan v. Parker and Court Martial Power
after Termination of Active Duty, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1262 (1970). For a more complete
bibliography, see Relford v. Commandant, 401 US. 355, 356-57 n.1 (1971).
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We have concluded that the crime to be under military juris-
diction must be service connected.... In the present case petitioner
was properly absent from his military base when he committed
the crimes for which he is charged. There was no connection-not
even the remotest one-between his military duties and the crime
in question.
48
The Supreme Court thus erected a standard of "service connection"
to determine if a military court had jurisdiction to try cases involving
servicemen.
A. Service Connection and the Courts
In its only amplification of O'Callahan, the Supreme Court held
that crimes committed by servicemen against either person or property
on a military installation were service connected. Speaking for a
unanimous court in Relford v. Commandant,0 Justice Blackmun up-
held the 1961 conviction of Isiah Relford, an Army corporal, for kid-
napping and raping two women on the Fort Dix, N.J., military
reservation. The court-martial, proceeding under UCMJ Articles 120
and 134, found that Relford had committed the crimes against the
sister of a serviceman and the wife of an airman while the women were
legally on military property.
In Relford, the Court identified on the basis of O'Callahanw eleven
indicia of non-connection with the service, but did not indicate how
many of these ingredients are required to establish a lack of service
connection, or even if the list is exhaustive. The factors are: (1) the
serviceman's proper absence from the base; (2) the crime's commission
away from the base; () its commission at a place not under military
control; (4) its commission within our territorial limits and not in an
occupied zone of a foreign country; (5) its commission in peacetime51
and its being unrelated to authority stemming from the war power; (6)
48. 395 U.S. at 272-73.
49. 401 U.S. 355 (1971), af'g 409 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1969).
50. As ir. Justice Douglas explained in O'Callahan:
In the present case petitioner was properly absent from his military base when
he committed the crimes with which he is charged. There was no connection-not
even the remotest one-betiveen his military duties and the crimes in question. The
crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; nor was the person whom
he attacked performing any duties relating to the military. Moreover, Hawaii, the
situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under military control, as are some of our
far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority stemming from the
war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses were committed within our terri-
torial limits, not in the occupied zone of a foreign country. The offenses did not
involve any question of the flouting of military authority, the security of a military
post, or the integrity of military property.
395 U.S. at 273-74.
51. Justice Blackmun assumed that despite the Vietnam conflict. Relford's offense oc-
cmrred in peacetime. 401 U.S. at 366.
1689
The Yale Law Journal
the absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties
and the crime; (7) the victim's not being engaged in the performance
of any duty relating to the military; (8) the presence and availability
to a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted; (9) the absence
of any flouting of military authority; (10) the absence of any threat to
a military post; and (11) the absence of any violation of military prop-
erty. To these Justice Blackmun added "still another factor implicit
in the others": (12) the offense's being among those traditionally prose-
cuted in civilian courts.
5 2
O'Callahan met all twelve conditions; hence, his offense was not
service connected and he was beyond military jurisdiction. Relford's
situation paralleled O'Callahan's in regard to points (4), (6), (8), (11),
(12), and possibly (5) and (10). But Relford failed to satisfy conditions
(1), (2), (3), (7), and (10), and this was held sufficient to establish service
connection. Relford's offense took place on base, one victim (a Post
Exchange employee) was performing a military-related duty, and the
crimes violated the post's security.
It can hardly be pretended that the facts which will establish or
defeat service connection are very clear. At least one commentator has
suggested that the failure to satisfy condition (7) is by itself sufficient
to establish service connection.53 Although this suggestion renders the
rest of the Relford analysis somewhat superfluous, it is not inconsistent
with a number of pre-Relford decisions by the Court of Military Ap-
peals.54
It should also be observed that the Court of Military Appeals has
found instances of service connection outside the Relford situation
when the defendant overtly uses his military status or rank to commit a
crime. In United States v. Fryman,5 for example, the conviction of a
Marine private who listed himself as an officer to establish credit in a
civilian hotel was upheld on the ground that the defendant's false
representation of his rank had been a necessary basis for his crime,
thereby establishing that it was service connected.5 0
52. Id. at 365.
53. Zillman, Recent Developments, 52 MILrrARY L. Ray. 169 (1971).
54. For example, that tribunal found service connection in an act of sodomy between
twro servicemen in an off-base apartment, reasoning that any crime involving servicemen
as both perpetrator and victim damages the morale, reputation, and good order of the
military. United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970).
For other cases where this theory was applied, see, e.g., United States v. Everson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969) (assault with a deadly weapon); United States v, Cook,
19 U.S.C.M.A. 13, 41 C.M.R. 13 (1969) (larceny); United States v. Comacho, 19 U.S,C.MIA.
11, 41 C.M.R. 11 (1969) (housebreaking).
55. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 71, 41 C.M.R. 71 (1970).
56. Id. at 73.
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B. Service Connection and Indebtedness
Although the notion of service connection is hardly very perspicuous,
it would appear that under either Relford or a "military status" test
(such as that in Fryman) most prosecutions for dishonorable failure to
pay debt would not be service connected. 7 Under Relford, only the
first category of prosecutions (where there is a potentially detrimental
effect on military discipline) would be arguably service connected.
Since the victim would be a military person, critical condition (7)
would not be satisfied; moreover the transaction would be likely to
occur on post. The other two categories involve off-post transactions. s
In the second category, that concerning fraudulent transactions, the
offense would fit all twelve points listed in Relford and so would dearly
not be service connected. In the final category, only point (12)-the
lack of a civilian counterpart-is present. This point is by far
the weakest of the Relford criteria; it is nowhere suggested in Relford
that it alone would be sufficient to establish service connection. No
states permit criminal prosecutions and imprisonment for debt, absent
fraud. Consequently, a serviceman could not suffer criminal con-
sequences, in a state court action, for dishonorable failure to pay a debt.
Yet this fact alone would not seem to permit the military to extend
jurisdiction. Confronted with an analogous situation in Moylan v.
Laird, a Rhode Island District Court held that a serviceman was en-
titled to benefit from the civilian sovereign's decision not to prosecute
at all.59
The "military status" test to establish jurisdiction will seldom be
useful in indebtedness prosecutions. Since the crime is dishonorable
failure to pay, and not, as in Fryman, the fraudulent use of a military
status, it would not matter, under ordinary circumstances, whether
the serviceman wore his uniform or told the merchant his rank at the
time the obligation was incurred. Of course, if he used his military
status to defraud the creditor, prosecution would be appropriate under
separate UCMJ provisions.60
57. The jurisdictional dilemma posed by indebtedness has been recognized by t-.o Air
Force attorneys, who suggest administrative discharges as potential sanctions against the
debtor. Dagle & Lasseter, Straight Banhruptfc-the Wage Earners' Plan and the Military
Debtor, 13 U.S.A.F. JAG L. REV. 137, 151 (1971).
58. Credit sales in post exchange facilities are limited to purchases of uniforms, use
of gasoline credit cards and a few other items. 32 C.F.L § 544.10 (1971).
59. 305 F. Supp. 551, 556 (D.R.I. 1969).
60. See, eg., Article 121, 10 U.S.C. § 921 (1970) (larceny); Article 123a, 10 U.S.C. § 923a
(1970) (worthless check); Article 132, 10 U.S.C. § 932 (1970) (frauds against the govern-
ment), and Article 134 specifications for impersonating an officer or non-commissioned
officer and the incorporation of all federal criminal statutes.
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Nor can it be said that "dishonor" alone makes debt prosecutions
service connected. Prior to O'Callahan the argument was accepted that
any deviant act by a serviceman discredits the military and can be
prosecuted under Article 134. This theory was later rejected by the
Court of Military Appeals, which ruled that an offense triable under
Article 134 is not necessarily service connected merely because it may
reflect discredit on the service.61 Jurisdiction has been denied to mili-
tary courts in cases involving robbery and rape of civilians off post,02
burglary and larceny in a civilian community,03 and the off-base murder
of a civilian. 64 If raping the shopkeeper's daughter or stealing his
goods in itself does not confer court-martial jurisdiction, it is difficult
to make out a plausible case for it where the sole offense is not paying
a bill.
C. O'Callahan and the Misdemeanor
It might be objected, in a final effort to save prosecutions for dis-
honorable failure to pay debt, that these prosecutions are somehow
insulated from the effect of O'Callahan. The Court of Military Appeals
has, indeed, recently attempted to limit the scope of the O'Callahan
mandate by declaring it applicable only to serious crimes. In United
States v. Sharkey,65 a Marine was convicted for being drunk and dis-
orderly in uniform in a public place while off duty. The court martial
sentenced the enlisted man to four months confinement and forfeitures
of 90 per month for four months. The Court of Military Appeals re-
jected Sharkey's contention that his offense was not service connected:
It is important to read O'Callahan . . . not by rote, but with an
eye to the important constitutional protection which it sought to
preserve to the soldier-accused. Thus, it specifically dealt with a
civil-type offense, which if left to military jurisdiction, would
offer "no way of saving servicemen and servicewomen in any
case the benefit of indictment and of trial by jury." Here, how-
ever, we are confronted with a petty military offense.00
Citing Supreme Court decisions that the constitutional guarantee of
indictment and jury trial did not apply to civilian misdemeanors, the
Court of Military Appeals concluded that O'Gallahan applied only
61. United States v. Morriseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17, 18, 41 C.M.R. 17, 18 (1969).
62. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969).
63. United States v. Chandler, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 805 (1969).
64. United States v. Armstrong, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 5, 41 C.M.R. 5 (1969).
65. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969). For a discussion of the impact of Sharkey,
see Crawford, The Ambit of O'Callahan, 12 U.SA.F. JAG L. REV. 100, 109 (1970),
66. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 27, 41 C.M.R. at 27.
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to major crimes. It decided that any crime punishable by six months
imprisonment or less was a petty crime and so not governed by the
criteria for service connection laid down in O'Callahan, and that court-
martials could in such cases exercise their traditional jurisdiction.
Even if the Sharkey rationale is accepted, it would not apply to
prosecutions for dishonorable failure to pay a debt, since Sharkey
involved a less serious crime. The court seemed to base its holding
entirely on a six month maximum prison term, which applies equally
to the offense of being drunk and disorderly and to the indebtedness
offense. The indebtedness offense, however, also permits a bad con-
duct discharge for the first conviction.67 This magnifies the seriousness of
the crime, for the Army admits that a prejudicial discharge can be
more serious than a felony conviction. In an official Army publication,
military judges are told to instruct the jury that a bad conduct dis-
charge is more severe than imprisonment at hard labor for one year.63
Consequences of such a discharge include loss of retirement pay and
other veteran's rights, and the severe restriction of opportunities for
civilian employment, credit standing and entrance to licensed profes-
sions. 69
Moreover, the Sharkey rationale itself is vulnerable to direct attack
on several fronts. First, O'Callahan did not restrict the service con-
nection criterion to felony-level cases. The Supreme Court cited defects
in the system of military justice that apply to any court-martial re-
gardless of the seriousness of the crime, such as the possibility of com-
mand influence, the existence of judges who are not constitutionally
protected as to tenure and salary, and the lack of a requirement of a
unanimous vote for a guilty verdict7 0 These characteristics result in
military courts falling short of the kind of qualifications that the Con-
stitution has set for fair trials of civilians in federal courts.7'
67. The table of maximum punishments for military crimes is contained in UANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTAL UNrrED STATES 127c (rev. ed. 1969). The punishment listed in the
text can be imposed either by a general court-martial, or by a special court-martial
complying with the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1970).
68. U.S. DEPr oF AntY, PAmPH=.u No. 27-29, Mirurmgy JuDGES' GUIDE § 8-8 (1969).
69. For a compilation of the service connected sanctions resulting from a prejudicial
discharge, see Bednar, Discharge and Dismissal As Punishment In the Armed Forces, 16
,fIUARY L. REa. 1 (1962).
It may be objected that as a matter of legal doctrine Slzarkey stands for the proposition
that if a crime is not punishable by more than six months imprisonment it is ipso facto
not "serious" and consequences other than imprisonment are irrelevant. The objection is
unsound, for it involves an implausible interpretation of Sharhey, is inconsistent with the
Army's general position on this matter (see note 68 supra), and is implausible on its face
(since the consequences of a bad conduct discharge are indeed more serious than six
months imprisonment).
70. 395 U.S. at 263-64.
71. Id. at 262-63, quoting from Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1955).
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Secondly, it is arguable that no military criminal offense can be
considered a petty crime, since two previous convictions within three
years make any court martial offense punishable by a bad conduct
discharge. Chief Judge Quinn cited this provision in his concurrence
in Sharkey to support his contention that no military crime can
abstractly be described as minor.
72
Finally, Sharkey would seem to rest on a mistaken interpretation of
O'Callahan. In Sharkey, the Court of Military Appeals relied on a
"functional" notion of jurisdiction. It interpreted O'Callahan to mean
that military courts lacked jurisdiction because they did not provide
constitutional guarantees which an accused must have, e.g., indictment
by a grand jury and trial by jury. Reasoning inversely, the court con-
cluded that if the guarantees were not required for minor crimes, the
military courts would provide the same process as civilian courts. In
that situation, military courts could retain jurisdiction.
But a recent habeas corpus case, Flemings v. Chafee,73 persuasively
argues that O'Callahan dealt with jurisdiction in the classical legal
sense, i.e. the power to judge a controversy. In Flemings, a 1944 court-
martial conviction of a sailor for off-base auto theft was overturned.
Judge Weinstein ruled that O'Callahan should have retroactive applica-
tion.74 He held that "classic" jurisdiction was the central focus in
O'Callahan; without a showing of service connection, military courts
lack power over the subject matter. On the facts of this case, the
court found that Flemings failed to meet only two points listed in
O'Callahan and Relford for the determination of lack of service con-
nection: he was absent without leave and the United States was
involved in a global war.75 This was deemed insufficient for service
connection. An interpretation relying on "classic" jurisdiction, then,
makes the alternative procedure in civilian courts irrelevant to court-
martial jurisdiction. There is military jurisdiction only if the crime,
be it major or minor, is service connected.70
72. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 28, 41 C.M.R. at 28.
78. 880 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. The Court of Military Appeals found O'Callahan non-retroactive. Mercer v. Dillon,
19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264 (1970). But see Judge Ferguson's dissent, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
at 278, 41 C.M.R. at 278, employing a subject matter theory of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court expressly reserved the issue of retroactivity in Relford. 401 U.S. at 870.
75. 830 F. Supp. at 198.
76. H.R. 579, 92d Cong., ist Sess. (1971), would make the jurisdictional dilemma poscd
by O'Callahan moot. The bill would give federal district courts original jurisdiction for
offenses punishable currently by Article 88 and Articles 107-134 UCMJ, If the offense
were committed within the territorial limits of the United States.
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III. Conclusion
The military crime of dishonorable failure to pay a just debt raises
serious policy and jurisdictional problems. Prosecution serves no per-
missible military goal that cannot be achieved through other means,
and operates, in its breadth, to disadvantage the non-fraudulent mili-
tary debtor. The military currently performs a service for creditors
quite beyond that performed by other government-employer agencies.
Even if it is deemed wise for the military to involve itself in facilitating
the task of creditors, the crime of dishonorable failure to pay a just
debt is a poor, because ineffective, policy. Finally, it appears that
courts-martial lack jurisdiction to entertain prosecutions for debt.
Now, when much is made of the prospect of an all-volunteer army,
it would be both timely and just to eliminate from the military experi-
ence this pernicious anachronism.
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